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Leegin, the Rule of Reason, and Vertical Agreement 
Herbert Hovenkamp*
 
 
Unlike horizontal agreements among competitors, which are relatively uncommon, vertical 
agreements between actual or would-be suppliers and customers are everywhere. Sales, licenses, 
franchises, employment agreements, and information arrangements are commonplace. Their very 
ubiquity indicates that only a few will be of antitrust concern. 
Obviously, the ordinary sales contract fixes the transaction price, but it does not restrain 
trade; indeed, without it, trade would be impossible. The transmission of information from an 
expert to an insurer may influence the insurer's decision about coverages to offer or 
reimbursements to make, but no restraint would ordinarily arise, even if an agreement were 
thought to be present. 
While there is a wide array of possible vertical agreements, the concern here is agreements 
between a manufacturer and its dealers or other customers concerning (1) dealer resale prices, (2) 
territories or customers, or (3) purchases of other products from that manufacturer or from its 
rivals. “Resale price maintenance” is the term for the first category; “restricted redistribution” is 
the term for the second category; “tying” and “exclusive dealing” are other words for restraints in 
the third category. Although the substantive legality of such agreements is discussed in 
subsequent chapters,1
There are two overlapping policy reasons for being concerned with horizontal “agreements.” 
Neither reason applies in the same way to vertical agreements. First, agreements concern us 
because cooperative action creates a restraint that is not otherwise possible. In the horizontal 
context, one competitive firm alone cannot fix prices or exclude rivals from the market without 
rival participation in that exercise. In one sense, the same is true in the vertical area, where a 
manufacturer obviously cannot fix a dealer's resale price or force a tied product upon the dealer 
without the dealer's cooperation (although a manufacturer retailing its product can lawfully 
charge any retail price it wishes). Nevertheless, a purely vertical agreement does not fix 
marketwide prices unless the parties control the market. 
 the present discussion may mean more when we remember that resale price 
maintenance agreements, nonprice restrictions on distribution,  and exclusive dealing are all 
judged by the rule of reason. Tying is  still said to be unlawful per se when the idiosyncratic 
requirements of tying law are met. To simplify the exposition, we will speak primarily of the 
parties to these transactions as the “manufacturer” and the “dealer.” But the upstream (selling) 
party could be a supplier of inputs, a distributor, or even a retailer, and the downstream party 
(buyer) could be a manufacturer procuring an input, or even a consumer purchasing from a 
retailer. 
Second, horizontal agreements concern us because they may create market power that did not 
previously exist. The ordinary cartel agreement creates market power by consolidating the 
priceoutput choices of firms that otherwise lack power over output or price. Of course, not every 
agreement between two or more rivals creates significant or even measurable power—such as, for 
example, in the case of two farmers agreeing to share an expensive piece of equipment or two 
solo practicing lawyers who agree to share an office. 
                                                 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 
1See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, chs. 16B,C (minimum 
and maximum resale price maintenance), Ch. 16D (restricted distribution), Ch. 17 
(tying), Ch. 18 (exclusive dealing) (3d ed. 2010) (in press). 
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As a general matter, a purely vertical agreement does not increase anyone's market power, 
although it may reflect the preexisting power of one party. Indeed, most litigated vertical 
agreements involve not so much consent or coordination but are a response to the manufacturer's 
unilateral power to substitute another dealer. Nevertheless, courts have long held 
manufacturerdealer agreements on resale prices (and the other matters mentioned earlier) to be 
“contracts, combinations…or conspiracies” within the meaning of Sherman Act §1.2 The natural 
meaning of the statutory phrases and clear precedent give us this starting point: notwithstanding 
important differences from horizontal agreements, vertical agreements are covered by §1. To be 
determined are the elements of the requisite “agreement” in the absence of the conventional 
exchange of promises. 
The recurringly litigated questions center on whether refusals to deal create vertical 
agreements. Of course, there are many refusals to deal in contexts other than vertical agreements. 
For example, a vertically integrated firm, whether a monopolist or not, may refuse to deal with 
outside firms. Or a refusal to deal may be incident to a joint venture or even a “boycott.”3
There is, of course, an element of artificiality in discussing the existence of an agreement 
independently of the competitive policies and substantive rules governing resale price 
maintenance, restricted distribution, tying, and exclusive dealing. When antitrust tribunals are 
sensitive to the full range of relevant interests in ruling about the legality of these arrangements in 
particular cases, there might seem little reason to worry very much about the existence of an 
agreement: any reasons for denying the presence of an agreement can be fully considered in 
making the ultimate judgment about legality. And if the reasons for prohibiting or controlling 
certain conduct are very strong, it makes sense to err on the side of over-inclusiveness in 
determining the presence of an agreement. 
 The 
refusals to deal with which this chapter is concerned are those with effects similar to express 
vertical agreements. There are two basic situations. First, does an agreement arise when a 
manufacturer secures compliance by announcing that it will continue dealing only with dealers 
who comply with its specified condition and by ceasing to deal with those who do not? Second, 
does an agreement arise when a manufacturer terminates one dealer after receiving a complaint 
from a rival dealer? These are the issues of the first two divisions of this Subchapter. 
Nevertheless, it is not analytically convenient to consider all topics simultaneously, and the 
agreement question is commonly considered separately in actual litigation. So we try to consider 
the agreement concept largely, although not entirely, independently of the agreement's subject. 
For the same reasons, our analysis concerning the presence or absence of an agreement is largely 
independent of our own opinions about the legality of the vertical restraints that may result.4
Identifying the Correct Agreement 
 
Given the ubiquity of vertical agreements, we need to be clear on which ones should be of 
concern to antitrust law. Too many cases have asked whether an agreement is present without 
considering the nature of the agreement sought. Indeed, virtually every case alleging resale price 
maintenance or other vertical restraints involves firms who are the parties to some agreement. For 
example, when a dealer alleges unlawful resale price maintenance, it would be pointless to 
conclude that the agreement requirement is met because the manufacturer and dealer are engaged 
in buying and selling with each other. That would be tantamount to eliminating the agreement 
requirement altogether. In 49er Chevrolet dealers had complained that their contracts with 
                                                 
2E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See 8 
Antitrust Law ¶1620 (3d ed. 2010). 
3See 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Ch. 22 (2d Ed. 2004). 
4See id., chs. 16-18. 
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General Motors specified the maximum price that GM would pay for dealer services on vehicles 
under warranty to consumers or on vehicles damaged in transit.5
                                                 
549er Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp., 803 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
480 U.S. 947 (1987). Dealers also agreed not to seek additional compensation from the 
carriers who had transported the vehicle. See also Ehredt Underground v. 
Commonwealth Edison, 848 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff'd, 90 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1056 (1997) (no agreement to require union contractors 
could be inferred from public utility agency agreement with local telephone company 
when that agreement explicitly provided that the utility alone would make all such 
decisions). The claim was subsequently dismissed, 90 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1056 (1997); Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, 924 F.2d 1555 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (no antitrust conspiracy between franchisee's fish suppliers and a distributor 
to limit fish sales could be inferred merely from the fact that low-level employees of the 
distributor took fish orders from low-level employees of the suppliers). 
 The court found no antitrust 
violation, because the agreement merely stated the price that GM would pay for the services it 
bought; it did not regulate anyone's resale price. 
Cf. Virginia Vermiculite v. W.R. Grace & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 549(W.D. Va. 2000) 
(concluding that restrictive covenants in gift deeds from a mining firm to a charitable 
organization satisfied the agreement requirement with respect to claim of conspiracy 
between the grantor and grantee to cut off a rival mining firm's access to reserves; but 
that particular agreement was hardly relevant to the alleged antitrust conspiracy; for 
example, suppose we give Blackacre, which neighbors our gasoline station, to the First 
Baptist Church subject to a restriction that no gasoline station be operated in Blackacre; 
the church, intending to use the land for other purposes, happily accepts the gift, but our 
own purpose is to deny any competitor the right to build a gasoline station on the 
donated land; the church has agreed to accept the gift of the land, but it has hardly 
agreed to exclude our rival from the gasoline market. The distinguishing feature in the 
Virginia case was that the plaintiff also claimed a sub rosa agreement between 
commercial interests controlling the charitable organization and the mining defendant; if 
so, that would be the agreement necessary to establish concerted antitrust action).  In 
any event, in later litigation the Fourth Circuit concluded that the mere receipt of a gift 
deed containing a restrictive servitude did not constitute an agreement with the grantor.  
Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. V. Historic Green Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied 538 U.S. 998 (2003): 
In the instant case, VVL proffered no evidence that the donation by Grace to 
HGSI was not a genuine ( i.e., unilaterally given) gift. It often can be difficult to 
determine whether a purported gift is a gift in fact, or whether it merely disguises 
bilateral action by which two parties join their resources, rights, or economic power 
together. But here, VVL simply did not proffer evidence sufficient to raise that difficult 
question. VVL did not proffer evidence that HGSI joined any resource to Grace's in 
order to establish the covenants, or to affect the land transfer. Nor did VVL allege 
that HGSI exercised a right or economic power in consideration for the gift. In other 
words, insofar as the record discloses, only Grace, not HGSI, exercised any form of 
right, resource, or economic power…. 
….  Grace alone had the right and power to attach the covenants. Its unilateral 
action in doing so was …  beyond the reach of section 1. As a result, we conclude 
that VVL did not proffer evidence that the defendants “had a conscious commitment 
to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective…. 
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Courts often use the term “unilateral” to state their conclusion that no unlawful agreement 
exists, but that term can be used in three quite different ways, which need to be untangled. A 
court may describe a vertical restraint as “unilateral” to express a factual conclusion that the 
manufacturer adopted the restraint to serve its own interests, conceived without regard to dealer 
preferences, even though the restraint itself is expressed in a dealer franchise agreement. Another 
court may describe a restraint as “unilateral” to express a factual conclusion that a manufacturer 
or dealer did not make any promise or commitment or even communication to the other party. For 
many courts, finally, the term “unilateral” (or not unilateral) expresses the legal conclusion that 
the challenged conduct—for example, implementing advance announcements that the 
manufacturer will cease to supply those who fail to adhere to specified prices—is (or is not) 
deemed to be a “contract, combination, or conspiracy” for Sherman Act purposes. 
A relatively common suit involves a dealer's claim that it was terminated by a manufacturer 
because of its price cutting pursuant to the manufacturer's agreement with itself, with dealers 
generally, or with a specific complaining dealer about the plaintiff's prices, prices generally, a 
complainer's prices, or access to the manufacturer's product. Rather than separating the 
“because,”“pursuant to,” or “about” questions, a court's discussion of permissible inferences may 
blend them together. For example, some courts forget to ask the latter two questions when there is 
sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the motive for the termination was the plaintiff's 
price cutting rather than, say, its poor service. Other courts focus on whether the manufacturer 
acted to implement its own distribution policy, apparently assuming that even price-related 
terminations involve no agreement unless the manufacturer was induced to serve the 
anticompetitive interests of complaining dealers as distinct from its own. Yet other courts fail to 
distinguish a manufacturer's concern for resale prices as such as distinct from a concern about, 
say, free riding by discounting dealers on the services provided by other dealers.6
These several ambiguities infect the cases attempting to apply the standards of Subchapter 
14A to the inference of vertical agreements. We saw in that Subchapter, for example, that no 
agreement among competitors can be inferred from ambiguous circumstances unless they have a 
motive to coordinate their behavior.
 
7
Illustrating some of the difficulties is the Helicopter decision.
 That is also true in the vertical context, although we need to 
define the motive that is relevant. For example, a motive to affect resale prices (1) is not 
meaningful unless we distinguish resale price control as such from preventing free riding on 
important services provided by other dealers and (2) is not determinative unless the means for 
doing so—for example, suggesting resale prices, terminating uncongenial dealers, announcing in 
advance that noncompliant dealers will be terminated, bowing to the will of a complaining dealer, 
or implementing resale price agreements with others—is deemed to constitute an agreement for 
Sherman Act purposes. In short, “motive” should not be considered abstractly. 
8 The Eleventh Circuit ruled 
that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff shows that the alleged 
conspiracy is “objectively an economically reasonable one” rather than “economically infeasible 
or irrational.”9
                                                 
6See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶1611-1613 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 Correctly understanding that a conspiracy cannot be inferred merely because it 
would serve the economic interests of the alleged conspirators, the court also ruled that the 
“plaintiff in a distributor-termination case must also be able to point to evidence which tends to 
exclude the possibility that the manufacturer was operating independently in making its decision 
7See ¶1412. 
8Helicopter Support Sys. v. Hughes Helicopter, 818 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1987). 
9Id. at 1534. The court was relying on Supreme Court summary judgment decisions 
that considered evidence of horizontal agreements. 
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to terminate the distributor.”10
In discussing motive, however, the court seemed to be satisfied that the manufacturer had a 
motive to control the plaintiff's prices (as distinct from a motive to serve the complainer's 
interests)—namely, that it would profit from its distributor's higher resale prices.
 Here, “mere complaints” from competing distributors were 
deemed insufficient to satisfy the second prong of the court's test, which apparently defined the 
relevant agreement as conduct not serving the manufacturer's own interest (conceived without 
regard to the complainer's objectives). 
11 But a supplier 
ordinarily cannot enrich itself by resale price maintenance—for any excess profit resulting from 
inflated resale prices will accrue to the dealer rather than to the manufacturer.12 A more plausible 
reason was offered by the defendant—namely, that the plaintiff “was terminated because it 
provided inadequate service to local Florida customers.”13
The key point is that the tribunal must first define its concept of an agreement and then ask 
whether the defendant had a motive to enter into that agreement. If unilateral termination of a 
price cutter because of price cutting does not constitute an agreement, then no agreement exists 
unless there is a motive for and evidence of the manufacturer's agreement with some third party.
 But even if the motive for termination 
had been dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's prices, that would not establish any motive for the 
manufacturer to enter into an agreement with the complainer. 
14
 
 
Leegin and Vertical Agreements 
 
Leegin overturned the longstanding rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance and 
applied a rule of reason.S1
                                                 
10818 F.2d at 1534. 
 One might think that the question whether a vertical “agreement” exists 
11Id. 
12See 8 Antitrust Law ¶1603 (2d ed. 2010). 
13Helicopter, 818 F.2d  at 1531. 
14See  Viazis v. Am. Assn. of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 1033 (2003) (no conspiracy among orthodontists' association and 
manufacturer of plaintiff's orthodontic invention could be inferred from the fact that 
individual orthodontists apparently acting on their own sent complaints to the 
manufacturer and manufacturer subsequently stopped making the invention); Imaging 
Center, Inc. v. Western Maryland Health Sys., Inc., 158 Fed. Appx. 413, 2005 WL 
3403627 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2005) (plaintiff radiologist could not show a boycott 
agreement between hospitals and their physicians to deny referrals to plaintiff; no 
evidence that hospitals insisted that doctors not make such referrals; many physicians 
had expressed concerns about plaintiff's practice, indicating that their decisions were 
exercises of independent judgment); HLD Enterp., Inc. v. Michelin North America, Inc., 
2004 WL 2095739, 2004-2 Trade Cas. ¶74,520 (N.D. Ga. June 29, 2004) (rejecting 
claim of conspiracy against tire manufacturer that sold tires to large discount price clubs 
at lower prices than it charged the plaintiffs; the complaint was of unilateral conduct).; 
Magid Mfg. Co. v. U.S.D. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 325, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (“plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the [defendant] is behaving in a way that is inconsistent with unilateral 
decisionmaking”). 
 
S1Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007), on remand 
to 498 F. 3d 486 (5th Cir. 2007), overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
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between a manufacturer and a dealer should not be affected by the mode of analysis to be applied 
after an agreement is found. First one asks whether an agreement exists, and determines whether 
the per se rule or rule of reason applies only after receiving an affirmative answer. 
But ever since Colgate the Supreme Court has generally taken a more restrictive approach on 
the agreement issue in resale price maintenance cases than in cases involving nonprice 
restraints.S2 This was at least partly true because Colgate itself involved a criminal indictment for 
conduct that, at the time, was a per se violation of the antitrust laws.S3 Under this rule some courts 
even held that a manufacturer who responded to a powerful dealer's ultimatum to increase rival 
dealers' prices was acting unilaterally.S4
Under the rule of reason such strictness is no longer necessary because anticompetitive 
effects are no longer inferred from the price agreement alone. For example, if a powerful dealer 
insists on protecting its margins by asking a supplier to terminate a price-cutting dealer, the only 
real question is whether the price restraint is initiated freely by the manufacturer in order to 
control the quality of its dealers and their services, or whether it capitulates to dealer power. In 
the latter case a finding of agreement is warranted. 
 
In any event, the consequences of not finding an agreement are not quite the same when the 
underlying restraint is addressed under the rule of reason. Both unilateral and multilateral conduct 
that result in reduced output and higher prices are actionable, although unilateral conduct must 
meet the somewhat stricter structural standards of §2's monopolization or attempt offense. Indeed, 
recent case law exhibits a tendency to apply §2 rather than §1 to other vertical restraints, such as 
exclusive dealing and tying.S5
Finally, it should be clear that a naked horizontal agreement among two or more dealers to 
force a supplier to discipline a price-cutting rival remains unlawful per se under the same criteria 
that have always applied in the case of horizontal agreements. In this sense Leegin is simply an 
extension of the Supreme Court's conclusion in NYNEX that a purely vertical agreement between 
  During the Dr. Miles era the courts often went to great lengths to 
find that no agreement existed in cases alleging vertically maintained prices,  Undoubtedly they 
were impelled in part by perceptions that the Dr. Miles rule condemned too much.  But under the 
rule of reason many resale price maintenance agreements will be found lawful and, in any event, 
finding the requisite agreement permits the court to go directly to the most important issue, which 
is competitive effects.  As a result, more allowance on the agreement issue seems appropriate 
under the Leegin rule of reason. 
                                                 
S2United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).  See also Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984). 
 
S3See 6 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law  ¶¶1438c, d, 1445, 
1446 (3d ed. 2010). 
 
S4See, e.g., Garment District v. Belk Stores Servs., 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988). See 8 Antitrust Law ¶1625d (3d ed. 2010). 
 
S5United States v. Dentsply Intl., Inc., 399 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 536 
F.3d 1089 (2006) (applying §2 to exclusive dealing claim); United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (applying §2 to a 
potpourri of practices resembling tying and exclusive dealing). See generally ¶768; and 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and §2 of the Sherman Act, 90 Boston 
Univ.L.Rev.1611 (2010).   Cf. Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 
282 (4th Cir. 2009) (Leegin did not upset traditional rule that a legitimate consignment or 
distribution agent is not an independent actor). 
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two firms must be addressed under the rule of reason.S6
Vertical Agreements 
 
The degree of dealer compliance and its relation to the manufacturer's announced condition 
are usually uncertain. One might presume compliance or require proof of, say, 80 percent of retail 
sales at the specified price. We recommend the former course. That such compliance is caused by 
the announcement rather than dealer preference should also be presumed. Announced conditions 
with regard to tying and exclusive dealing should be presumed to be equivalent in market effect 
to express agreements. 
When we can fairly conclude that the market effects of announced conditions are equivalent 
to those of express agreements, we can consider the possibility of some kind of “extended” theory 
of agreement—an implied acceptance of the supplier's terms. The manufacturer's forceful 
objections that it makes no offer, requests no acceptance, and desires no dealer commitment with 
respect to goods on hand (which is the only thing the manufacturer cannot unilaterally control 
through selecting and replacing dealers); that the only understanding is that the parties will 
continue dealing with each other as long as their views about optimum resale prices coincide; that 
an announcement merely provides fair notice to dealers who might otherwise claim unfair 
surprise when terminated; and that any conspiracy invented here would be unfair to dealers and 
lead to harassment of suppliers. These objections may be overcome, albeit with some difficulty. 
When these compunctions are overcome, a vertical agreement can be found when there is an 
announced condition or its equivalent on future dealing, the sanction for noncompliance is 
credible, and the market effects are proved or presumed to be similar to those of express 
agreements. Manufacturers cannot fairly claim to be harassed when they announce express 
conditions, but the proposals outlined here can sometimes be triggered in the absence of 
announced conditions through pyramiding inferences built on isolated termination(s) found to 
enforce price control, tying, or exclusive dealing. Lest the extended agreement theories be unduly 
attenuated, antitrust tribunals should insist on clear evidence about the challenged termination(s). 
There is an alternative theory for reaching the announced condition on future dealing: a 
dealer charging a specified resale price only because of the manufacturer's termination threat 
surrenders its will to, and thereby “agrees” with, that manufacturer on the resale price. This 
coerced compliance theory is plausible but suffers from some weaknesses -- namely, doubts that 
the effects are really the same as those of express contracts and that the “agreement” concept 
aptly fits the manufacturer's implementation of its will through unilateral power. In addition, 
adopting a coercion theory may have unsuitable ramifications in other areas. Finally, the coercion 
theory suffers the embarrassment of not identifying the particular dealer who agreed, because any 
given dealer's compliance might reflect its personal choice rather than concern for continuing 
supply. Although this fact bears on who may sue and what must be proved, it is not fatal to all 
suits. For example, the conclusion that the manufacturer has agreed on resale prices with 
unnamed dealers adequately supports an injunction in a government equity suit. 
If the coercion theory were adopted, a vertical agreement would be found whenever there was 
an announced condition on future dealing, or its equivalent, with a credible sanction and market 
                                                 
S6NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128 (1998). In NYNEX the Court went to some 
lengths to distinguish its earlier decision in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 
359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959), which had applied the per se rule to an alleged horizontal 
agreement among appliance manufacturers to boycott the plaintiff retailer at the behest 
of a competing retailer. See NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 134-135. 
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effects similar to those of express agreements. The problems of implementation are similar to 
those accompanying the implied acceptance theory. 
From Colgate2 to Monsanto3
In Colgate the Supreme Court held that a manufacturer may refuse to deal with price-cutting 
dealers and may announce that condition in advance, without thereby entering any agreement 
with complying dealers. Although this seems inconsistent with any implied acceptance or 
coercion theory of agreement, no such theory was presented to the Court. 
 
If the Colgate privilege to choose one's suppliers or customers for reasons sufficient to 
oneself is not absolute, one might read the Court merely to permit a “simple” implementation of 
one's announced condition on future dealing. A limited privilege would resolve many of the 
difficulties of the extended agreement theories and allow an agreement to be found in cases of 
more “complex” enforcement mechanisms supplementing a manufacturer's announcement and 
implementation of its conditions on future dealing. Such a reconciliation of Colgate with the 
extended agreement theories is mainly consistent with the later Supreme Court decisions both 
supporting Colgate and retreating from it. Mainly, in its 1984 Monsanto decision the Court 
unanimously reaffirmed the Colgate principle by declaring that a manufacturer “can announce its 
resale prices in advance and refuse to deal” with noncompliers and that a dealer “is free to 
acquiesce…in order to avoid termination.” Agreement requires “a meeting of the minds” or a 
“common scheme,” which are not shown by conformity with the specified condition but require 
evidence that a dealer “communicated its acquiescence or agreement…sought by the 
manufacturer.” 
Although Monsanto did allow the jury to infer an agreement from admittedly ambiguous 
evidence falling far short of communicated commitment, the Court also emphasized evidence of 
directly communicated agreement, and it was very clear that unwilling compliance by dealers to 
avoid termination does not create an agreement; nor does compliance with a suggestion or 
announced condition amount to an implied agreement. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
an agreement, and this burden must be taken seriously, the Court suggested, so as not to undercut 
Colgate or the toleration of reasonable nonprice restrictions, which also tend to have price effects. 
Furthermore, Monsanto involved individualized efforts to obtain dealer compliance by means 
other than simple termination; indeed, the Court found direct evidence of traditional agreement. 
Thus, Monsanto clearly does not adopt the implied acceptance or coercion theories of 
agreement, but it may not entirely reject them. Taking Colgate as given, Monsanto did not pursue 
agreement concepts. Like the earlier case, Monsanto might be read to draw a gross distinction 
between simple and complex refusals to deal. On the simple and unilateral side of that line would 
be mere announcement and termination. On the complex and concerted side would be 
individualized negotiation with dealers, meetings, repeated exhortations, and perhaps the use of 
third parties (other than to gather information or to effect a termination). Such an interpretation is 
consistent with the results of Monsanto, though not necessarily with its methodology. 
Consider such individualized dealings between manufacturer and dealer as reannouncing the 
condition to particular dealers and informing a dealer that its nonconformity has been observed. 
Consider also the various forms of giving the dealer a second chance to continue as a customer, 
persuasion to comply, discussions and negotiation, and communicated assurances of compliance 
actually or implicitly requested. At least some of these individualized dealings amount to 
altogether traditional agreements. Indeed, even if such individualized dealings fall short of fairly 
                                                 
2United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
3Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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traditional express or implied agreements, they might be deemed agreements in another way. 
These “negotiations” weaken or even remove some of the compunctions against adopting an 
implied acceptance theory of agreement. A court declining to apply that theory to compliance 
with announced conditions generally should consider the question anew when confronted with 
individualized dealings. 
To restate the last point in a different way: individualized negotiations could manifest that 
“complex” enforcement that might exceed the Colgate-Monsanto permission for simple 
implementation of announced conditions on future dealings. 
Schrader's used vague language that might permit inferring an agreement from compliance 
with a manufacturer suggestion or demand in order to avoid termination.4 In Beech-Nut, 
involving traditional agreements and the use of intermediaries to control retailers, the Court 
emphasized the policy against resale price maintenance in finding a violation of Federal Trade 
Commission Act §5.5Bausch & Lomb found agreements on the basis either of wholesaler 
involvement in enforcement against retailers or of the “acceptance” by complying dealers of the 
manufacturer's plan.6Schwinn found an agreement on the basis of the manufacturer's “firm and 
resolute” insistence that it would terminate noncomplying dealers.7
In Parke, Davis
 To the extent that these cases 
suggest that mere compliance with the manufacturer's announced condition creates an agreement 
via implied acceptance or coercion, they are inconsistent with Monsanto. 
8
One should not read Parke, Davis as fashioning a distinctive rule for inferring agreements 
with intermediate distributors. If retailer compliance with an announced price condition on future 
dealing does not create an agreement as a conceptual matter, then wholesaler compliance with an 
announced condition on approved retailers cannot create an agreement either. The Parke, Davis 
Court did not say that it was creating a special agreement concept for wholesalers. Quite the 
contrary: it found manufacturer-retailer agreements as well and spoke throughout its opinion of 
reaching manufacturers who seek retailer compliance by means exceeding announcement of 
conditions and termination of those who fail to comply. 
 the manufacturer negotiated with individual retailers to induce them to 
comply with specified retail prices and refused to sell to noncomplying retailers and to 
wholesalers selling to unapproved retailers or to those not complying with specified wholesale 
prices. The Court found a manufacturer “combination” with wholesalers and retailers. Although 
there seemed to be traditional agreements between the manufacturer and some retailers with 
whom it negotiated individually, the Court did not rely on this fact. Rather, it emphasized the use 
of wholesalers to enforce resale price maintenance and the fact that the manufacturer was not 
content to obtain compliance with the retail prices it specified through the “voluntary 
acquiescence” of retailers. However, the Court made clear that no agreement arose merely from 
dealer compliance motivated by their desire to obtain the product subject to the manufacturer's 
announced condition on future dealing. 
One can read Parke, Davis as implicitly adopting the implied acceptance or coercion theories 
of agreement, subject to the qualification that simple announcement and termination do not create 
an agreement.  Colgate and Monsanto might be interpreted the same way. In that event, Parke, 
Davis survives to find agreements where announced conditions are enforced in a “complex” 
manner. Defining “complex” enforcement is difficult. The category should not include announced 
                                                 
4United States v. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85 (1920). 
5FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). 
6United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). 
7United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 371, 376 (1967). 
8United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
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conditions, terminations, or the use of third parties to gather information or to effect a 
termination. It should include control of third-party resales and, more arguably, individualized 
negotiations with dealers falling short of traditional agreement, and perhaps even exhortation 
meetings. 
One might also regard wholesalers reporting noncomplying dealers to the manufacturer as 
forming an “information conspiracy” with the latter. However, this theory does not survive 
Monsanto. 
Consider also the trouble-ridden Albrecht decision,9
Many lower courts came routinely to hold that unwilling compliance with another's demands 
in order to avoid termination created an agreement. This became so common that the Supreme 
Court's Albrecht dicta asserted without discussion that unwilling compliance by a terminated 
dealer or by dealers generally could establish an agreement. However, this approach is directly 
contrary to Monsanto, which declared expressly that compliance to avoid termination does not 
create an agreement.  More problematically, Albrecht also said that it was not frivolous to allege a 
relevant agreement between a manufacturer and consumers where the manufacturer contracted to 
sell directly to consumers in order to bypass or coerce a noncomplying dealer. That suggestion 
does not seem tenable. 
 where the Supreme Court found an 
illegal conspiracy between a supplier and those it hired to solicit and serve the customers of a 
dealer charging more than the supplier specified. The Court saw a program to obtain the 
plaintiff's individualized acquiescence, which thus went beyond the privilege of simple 
announcement and termination. To that extent, the Albrecht result can be consistent with the 
possible reading of Monsanto seen earlier. 
Assume that a plaintiff dealer has proved that it was terminated because it never complied 
with its supplier's resale price demands. Although such proof may gain the tribunal's sympathy, it 
also demonstrates that the plaintiff never agreed, under any theory, with the supplier. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff will attempt to show that rival dealers agreed with the manufacturer and 
that its own termination was related to those other agreements. In particular, the plaintiff will 
offer three reasons for inferring from its own termination that the manufacturer agreed with 
others. First, it would be futile for the manufacturer to terminate a plaintiff who is not distinctive 
unless most other dealers are complying. But the performance of other dealers satisfactory to the 
manufacturer does not itself establish agreements. Second, exemplary termination of the plaintiff 
makes the manufacturer's announced condition a more credible threat. But concrete 
implementation adds little to the announced condition backed by the presumptively credible 
threat of termination. In the absence of a generally announced condition, a particular termination 
may be its equivalent if other dealers are aware of the termination, of the reasons for it, and thus 
of what they must do to avoid termination. Perhaps these matters can be proven or even inferred 
from the terminating manufacturer's intent to send a message to its other dealers. But that intent 
may not itself be inferred merely from terminating the plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, explicit and generally circulated manufacturer suggestions, coupled with a 
termination for disobedience, may fairly be treated as equivalent to an announced condition on 
future dealing; but compliance with such conditions, if simply enforced, does not create an 
agreement under Colgate and Monsanto, although complex enforcement and individualized 
negotiation might do so. Third, the manufacturer pursuing such negotiation or enforcement with 
respect to the terminated plaintiff may also be doing so with respect to other dealers. We would 
presume so, unless the supplier explains singling out the plaintiff for individualized negotiation or 
complex enforcement. The supplier bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff's market 
                                                 
9Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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situation was distinctive or that the terminating employees were unusually zealous. The proposed 
presumption is subject to the caveat that the fact finder must be quite confident that the plaintiff 
was actually terminated for price discounting after individualized negotiation or complex 
enforcement. 
The impact of both Colgate and Monsanto is significantly reduced by Leegin.   During the 
Dr. Miles era many resources were used to litigate the agreement issue in resale price 
maintenance cases because liability commonly turned on it.  The likely impact of rule of reason 
treatment, however, is twofold.  First, suppliers will make their RPM agreements more explicit, 
thus making it clear that an agreement exists, just as typically occurs for the great majority of 
vertical nonprice restraints such as dealer location clauses.  Second, given that the rule of reason 
applies when an agreement is found, the liability standard may not be altogether different than for 
monopolization cases under §2 of the Sherman Act.  The principal difference will be that the 
question under §1 will be whether such an agreement “restrains trade,” which ordinarily entails a 
showing of reduced output.8.3  By contrast, under §2 the inquiry is whether the practice is 
undertaken by a dominant firm and unreasonably excludes competitors.9.4
Dealer Complaints 
 
Suppliers have sometimes terminated or otherwise imposed sanctions on a dealer after 
receiving complaints from that dealer's competitors. The terminated dealer is likely to charge that 
the manufacturer was implementing a resale price policy through agreement with other dealers. 
The policy impulses for finding a manufacturer-complainer agreement include the usual one of 
remedying the injury to a terminated dealer whose only vice, it asserts, was competition. A 
complaint plus responsive action does not create an agreement in the absence of “acceptance,” 
exchange, or quid pro quo, or perhaps the coercion of one by another. 
These dealer-complaint cases have proved difficult for the lower courts because historically 
they have implicated both horizontal-vertical and price - nonprice ambiguities, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Monsanto. Because the complainer is objecting to the plaintiff's competition 
at its own level, terminating the plaintiff is often said to be a “horizontal” restraint. However, 
most vertical restraints limit “horizontal competition” among distributors of the manufacturer's 
product.  This issue has acquired a somewhat different emphasis  since the Supreme Court’s 
Leegin decision declaring RPM to be subject to rule of reason analysis.9.5  A purely vertical 
agreement setting resale prices is unlawful only if unreasonable in the antitrust sense, while per se 
illegality may still apply to a properly defined naked horizontal agreement.  In any event, it seems 
clear that an agreement between a single dealer and its supplier to terminate a competing dealer 
because of low prices will be addressed under the rule of reason.  However, an agreement among 
two or more dealers to induce a supplier to terminate a third, price-cutting dealer might be 
regarded as unlawful per se, and one circuit has accepted that result with respect to the agreement 
among the dealers standing alone.  However, it applied the rule of reason to the agreement among 
the dealers and the manufacture, following dicta in Leegin that appears to command that result. 9.6
                                                 
8.3 See Chs. 19-20. 
  
In sum, previously the important difference was whether the restraint in question could be 
classified as “price” or “nonprice.”  Given Leegin, however, the more important distinction is 
between purely vertical or horizontal agreements. 
 
9.5 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
 
9.6 Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 224-225 
(3d Cir. 2008) (analyzing and condemning this situation). 
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Courts speaking in these horizontal-vertical terms are attempting to distinguish 
anticompetitive limitations serving the complainer's interest in excess dealer-level profits from 
potentially procompetitive limitations serving the manufacturer's interest in product promotion, 
customer services, or the like. Unfortunately, the presence of a dealer complaint does not 
distinguish one case from the other. Dealers may also share the manufacturer's interest in sale-
increasing services. Or the complaint may simply reflect the truism that one dealer cannot 
profitably comply with the manufacturer's desires for certain services, or for prices facilitating 
costly services, if rival dealers without such services sell the same product for less. 
Historically, manufacturer control of a dealer's resale price was  treated much more severely 
than control of resale territories, customers, services, and other “nonprice” matters.  Whether that 
continues to be true under Leegin is unclear at this writing, although we recommend closer 
scrutiny of vertical price agreements than of nonprice agreements.  Obviously, however, even 
permissible nonprice restraints usually affect prices. For the same reason, a complaint and a 
termination can obviously affect price and yet merely implement lawful customer or territorial 
agreements assuring resale services. This can be equally true when the manufacturer has no 
formal pre-complaint policy of limiting distribution. 
A curiosity of many dealer-complaint cases is their failure to identify the nature and content 
of the alleged complainer-manufacturer agreement. We show that the apparent subject matter of 
the alleged agreement is not the plaintiff's destruction but the manufacturer's distribution policy 
and its implementation, the complainer's future behavior, or both. Subsequent Paragraphs then 
test each interpretation of complaint and response according to various concepts of agreement, 
both theoretically and as they appeared in the courts. 
In Monsanto the Supreme Court ultimately supported a jury finding of vertical price 
agreements between Monsanto and nonterminated dealers without regard to the complaints from 
some of them about the plaintiff. The complaints were used simply as one of several elements 
supporting the jury decision that the plaintiff's termination was attributable to price discounting 
rather than to inadequate representation. The plaintiff's damage case was then completed by the 
Court's inference that terminating discounters was either part of, or pursuant to, the price 
agreements with others. 
The unanimous decision is important for the clarity with which the Court separated these 
several issues, for the policy premises it articulated, and for the legal test that emerged from those 
premises. The Court's policy premises were twofold: the elusiveness in fact of the law's 
distinctions and the appropriateness of information movements and consultations between a 
manufacturer and its dealers. Because nonprice restraints affect prices, one must be wary about 
using price-related complaints as evidence of vertical price agreements. Because dealer-
manufacturer information exchanges are natural and often unavoidable aids to efficient 
distribution, inferring conspiracies from them would unfairly interfere with rational distribution. 
These considerations led the Monsanto Court to hold that termination after or “in response 
to” complaints does not show a conspiracy. To get to the jury, the burden remains on the plaintiff 
to introduce additional evidence tending to exclude the possibility of independent action by the 
manufacturer and other dealers. As the Court earlier made clear in discussing the Colgate issue, 
“independent” action for this purpose includes acquiescence in another's “demand in order to 
avoid termination.” 
In this light, subsequent Paragraphs then examine the lower court decisions allowing 
complainer-manufacturer conspiracies to be based on a finding that the termination followed a 
complaint, responded to it (usually without distinguishing termination triggered by the 
complainer's facts about the plaintiff or by a compulsion to appease the complainer), or 
manifested a meeting of the minds. 
Hovenkamp Leegin and Vertical Agreement   Dec. 2010, Page 13 
At one time some courts allowed juries to find a manufacturer-complainer conspiracy merely 
from termination “after” a complaint. This proposition is unsound in principle, and most lower 
courts have rejected it. “After” does not mean “because.” Totally unconnected with a complaint, 
for example, would be a termination based on independent grounds, such as nonpayment, or on 
facts stated by the complainer but already known to the manufacturer. Perhaps the courts 
allowing the inference meant to shift to the manufacturer the burden of rebutting a causal 
connection between complaint and termination. But the case for such a shift is not compelling, 
and Monsanto held that the plaintiff has the burden of showing more than that termination 
followed a complaint. 
Most of the lower courts required a causal connection between the complaint and the 
plaintiff's termination. They insisted that the termination be “in response to” the complaint but 
usually without distinguishing two different kinds of responsive termination. A termination can 
be responsive in that the complainer coerces the manufacturer to adopt a restrictive distribution 
policy, or it can be responsive in that the complaint provides the information leading the 
manufacturer to terminate the plaintiff in implementing its own policy. Some courts found 
responsiveness in little more than a termination after the complaint. A few courts explained 
responsiveness in terms of providing the information triggering the termination and thus aiding or 
abetting the manufacturer in implementing a restrictive distribution policy. 
Further, termination responses reflecting the manufacturer's own distribution policy differ 
greatly from those imposed upon it by a complaining dealer. In the latter case, the manufacturer's 
compliance with the complainer's demand is more likely to be anticompetitive. The lower courts 
had apparently adopted the principle that coercion of the manufacturer creates an agreement but 
without determining how it might be proved. The argument for shifting to the manufacturer the 
burden of disproving coercion is not persuasive and may be precluded by Monsanto. Coercion 
seems presumptively absent when the manufacturer has a pre-complaint restricted distribution 
policy. Even without such a policy, the complaint may bring facts or arguments to the 
manufacturer's attention, which lead the manufacturer, in the exercise of a unilateral judgment, 
either to adopt such a policy or to conclude that a general policy is unnecessary but that the 
plaintiff dealer has “gone too far.” The complainer's bargaining power relative to the 
manufacturer is relevant but elusive. It need only be sufficient to persuade the reluctant 
manufacturer that it would lose less by terminating the plaintiff than by losing the patronage of 
the complainer and perhaps of other silent dealers who share the complainer's sentiments. Also 
illuminating, and elusive, are the “objective” merits of restricting distribution for a supplier in the 
defendant's position. 
Even if we could determine that a manufacturer terminated a plaintiff dealer solely because it 
felt compelled to placate a complainer, Monsanto seems to reject the coercion premise for finding 
an agreement. If dealer compliance to avoid the manufacturer's refusal to deal does not create an 
agreement, then manufacturer compliance to avoid the complainer's refusal to deal would also fall 
short of an “agreement,” unless the greater threat to competition demands a different result. A 
different result is not permitted if Monsanto and Colgate rest on a narrow agreement concept or 
on policies of free choice or of administrability that are also triggered when a dealer announces 
conditions on its future dealing. Monsanto may, however, allow an agreement finding when the 
complainer engages in “complex enforcement” of its announced conditions. 
One might see the complaint as an assurance by the complainer of its own future compliance, 
the termination as an assurance by the manufacturer of its commitment to resale price 
maintenance, or both parties' behavior as evidence of a preexisting agreement between them. 
However, these possibilities are entirely speculative in view of the many other possible 
interpretations of the complaint and the termination. As a legal matter, moreover, Monsanto raises 
several insuperable barriers to finding a tacit meeting of the minds in these circumstances. A 
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communicated assurance does not create an agreement unless it is sought. Beyond that, the Court 
made clear that the jury may not infer an agreement from a complaint and even a responsive 
termination. Additional evidence is required. To be sure, the Court said that admittedly 
ambiguous evidence supported the jury verdict, but this was in the context of direct evidence of a 
traditional agreement and of price stabilization efforts beyond mere announcement and 
implementation of conditions on future dealing.  
 
